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Respondents warn that if we decide petitioner lacks minimum contacts
in this case, it will bring about unfairness in cases where intentional
torts are committed via the Internet . . . [w]e leave questions about
virtual contacts for another day. 1
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of August 31, 2014, a collection of
celebrities, including famous actresses, models, and athletes,
awoke to discover that their intimate and often explicit
images had been posted across Internet message boards and
other websites. 2 All told, this widespread hack revealed the
private lives of over 100 celebrities. 3 Besides causing extreme
embarrassment for those affected, the theft and distribution
of the photographs thrust the threat of Internet torts into the
spotlight and revealed the importance of providing adequate
remedies to injured parties. One of the affected, actress
Jennifer Lawrence, described the hack as “disgusting,” noting
“[t]he law needs to be changed, and we need to change.” 4
Though the laws may not be changed quickly, this Article
anticipates that celebrities who had their photos released will
bring lawsuits against the hackers under current laws.
However, no matter how robust our state or national data
privacy regimes become, they will provide no relief if wouldbe defendants are beyond the jurisdiction of the American
legal system. While a great deal of research has been devoted
to the study of civil litigation arising out of Internet contacts
(often in the context of e-commerce), 5 there is little research
1. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014).
2. See, e.g., Rich McCormick, Hack Leaks Hundreds of Nude Celebrity
Photos, THE VERGE (Sept. 1, 2014, 2:29 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/1/
6092089/nude-celebrity-hack.
3. See McCormick, supra note 2.
4. Sam Kashner, Both Huntress and Prey, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2014),
http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-photo-hackingprivacy.
5. See, e.g., Sasha Segall, Jurisdictional Challenges in the United States
Government’s Move to Cloud Computing Technology, 23 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1105 (2013); Allyson W. Haynes, The Short Arm of the
Law: Simplifying Personal Jurisdiction over Virtually Present Defendants, 64 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 133, 150–51 (2009); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the
Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated
Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 80–85 (2006); Michael A. Geist, Is There a
There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY
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on the jurisdictional conditions precedent to making use of
those laws in the tort context. 6 This Article breaks new
ground by considering the Supreme Court’s most recent
pronouncement on specific personal jurisdiction in the case of
Walden v. Fiore. Specifically, this Article analyzes how the
Walden decision complicates civil actionsparticularly
against international defendantsarising out of torts
committed through the Internet. This Article exposes these
challenges through the lens of the 2014 celebrity photo hack.
Because data theft in the age of cloud computing disregards
traditional notions of sovereignty and strains the current
legal framework, the problem this Article poses will vex lower
courts until Internet jurisdiction issues are provided greater
clarity.
In Part II, this Article introduces a hypothetical test case
where one of the affected celebrities, Jennifer Lawrence, 7
attempts to press a tort claim in federal court in California
for relief against an international defendant. In Part III, this
Article considers the 2014 Supreme Court decision in Walden
v. Fiore, where the Court unanimously reaffirmed its
commitment to the “minimum contacts” test of specific
personal jurisdiction as a threshold for permitting suit
against out-of-state defendants. 8 The case recognized, but
declined to resolve, the petitioners’ concerns that the
reinforced rules might have implications for intentional torts
While the Court’s
perpetrated through the Internet. 9
restraint is laudable, this Article argues that the lack of clear
guidance on how to define specific personal jurisdiction in
Internet torts in light of Walden has created a potential zone
of ambiguous or non-existent personal jurisdiction, especially
in the context of a suit against international defendants. In
Part IV, this Article applies the Walden decision to the facts
of our hypothetical Lawrence case, revealing the weaknesses
under the current jurisdictional framework. Ultimately, this

TECH. L.J. 1345, 1347–49 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the
Internet Has Misdirected the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction
Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 574–75 (2009).
7. See, e.g., Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Leak, PEOPLE (Aug. 31,
2014), http://www.people.com/article/jennifer-lawrence-nude-photos.
8. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014).
9. Id. at 1125, n. 9.
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Article concludes in Part V by exploring potential remedies to
this gap in the jurisdictional jurisprudence.
I. TEST CASE: 2014 CELEBRITY PHOTO HACK
In August 2014, hackers released to the public a cache of
stolen images of over 100 celebrities on passive image hosting
websites. 10 While there is no certain theory on how the
images were stolen and the project is believed to be the work
of many different individuals working independently, 11 it is
widely accepted that hackers obtained the images remotely by
accessing phone data over the Internet that was stored in
Apple data centers. 12 One of those celebrities acutely affected
by the hack was Jennifer Lawrence. 13 This Article considers
a hypothetical (but very probable) sequence of events
surrounding Lawrence’s attempt to sue those who stole and
shared her photographs for civil damages.
A. Data Storage in the Cloud: Locating the Source of
the Theft
In order to develop this hypothetical, a working
understanding of how Internet data in “the cloud” is stored
and accessed is a fundamental first step. “The cloud” is an
evolution in Internet usage towards centralized off-site
This
computing systems and Internet-based storage. 14
process permits devices with limited storage to access large
amounts of data stored offsite. 15 Examples include Google
Docs and Gmail 16 as well as Apple’s iCloud, 17 the database
10. See McCormick, supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., James Vincent, Nude Celebrity Photo Hacks the Work of an
“Underground Nude Trading Ring,” Reports Claim, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/naked-celebrity
-photo-hacks-the-work-of-an-underground-nude-trading-ring-claim-reports9706787.html.
12. See Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Leak, supra note 7; see also
Justin Worland, How That Massive Celebrity Hack Might Have Happened, TIME
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://time.com/3247717/jennifer-lawrence-hacked-icloudleaked/.
13. See Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Leak, supra note 7.
14. See David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential or Enclosure
3.0?, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 190, 195 (2012).
15. Maamar Ferkoun, Top 7 Most Common Uses of Cloud Computing,
I.B.M. (Feb. 6, 2014), http://thoughtsoncloud.com/2014/02/top-7-most-commonuses-of-cloud-computing/.
16. Lametti, supra note 14, at 209.
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from which the stolen photographs were drawn. Databases
like these, which offer access over the Internet to stored
content, depend on large, centralized storage “data centers.” 18
The increased use of cloud services has led to a subsequent
increase in the construction of large-scale data centers around
the world to house that information. 19 Though the data is
always accessible on mobile devices, it is stored locally at the
data center (in addition to possibly being stored locally on the
user’s device). 20 By way of example, the music-streaming
program Spotify provides users the option of downloading
music for offline consumption. 21 Otherwise, the music is
available over an Internet connection by streaming it directly
through the company’s program. 22 In either case, the music is
accessed from physical storage on site at Spotify’s data
centers in Stockholm, London, Ashburn, or San Jose
(whichever is closest to the location of the user.). 23 As a
result, a person looking to access Spotify’s music does so by
tapping the physical information held in the nearest data

17. iCloud Drive, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Mar. 4,
2014) (“[W]ith iCloud Drive, you can safely store all your documents in iCloud
and access them from your iPhone, iPad, iPod touch, Mac, or even PC.”).
18. Paul Stryer, Understanding Data Centers and Cloud Computing,
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE WHITE PAPERS (2010), http://www.globalknowledge.nl/
content/files/documents/White-Papers/Cloud-Computing-White-Paper-Unders
tanding-Data-Centers (“A data center (sometimes called a server farm) is a
centralized repository for the storage, management, and dissemination of data
and information.”).
19. See, e.g., Vanessa Desloires, IBM Opens Data Centre in Melbourne to
Capture Cloud Demand, FINANCIAL REVIEW (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.afr.com
/p/technology/ibm_opens_data_centre_in_melbourne_8EJHXPvO6ftTZmDYfahS
YP; Penny Jones, U.S. Cloud Providers Lead EU Demand for Data Centers,
DATA CENTER DYNAMICS (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/
focus/archive/2014/03/us-cloud-providers-lead-eu-demand-data-centers;
Rich
Miller, Cloud Growth Spurs Demand for Data Centers, DATA CENTER
KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/
2012/03/12/cloud-growth-spurs-demand-for-data-centers/.
20. See Zuzanna Blaszkiewicz, What You Need to Know About Syncing
Photos in iCloud, SOFTONIC (Oct. 22, 2014), http://features.en.softonic.com/what
-you-need-to-know-about-syncing-photos-in-icloud.
21. Listen Offline, SPOTIFY, https://support.spotify.com/us/learn-more/guide
s/#!/article/Listen-offline (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
22. Farhad Manjoo, The World’s Greatest Music Service, SLATE (July 16,
2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2009/07/the_worlds_
greatest_music_service.html.
23. David Poblador I. Garcia, Spotify: Data Center & Backend Buildout,
SPOTIFY (July 10, 2013), http://www.slideshare.net/davidpoblador/spotify-bcn20
13slideshare.
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center.
Some liberties must be taken with the hypothetical at
this juncture. At the time that Jennifer Lawrence’s photos
were stolen, it appears that all of Apple’s iCloud data was
stored in U.S. data centers in California and North
Carolina. 24 Were it the case that the data was stolen from a
U.S. data-center, personal jurisdiction over the defendant
would likely be proper in the state containing the breached
However, foreign-based digital theft of
data center. 25
American information is an increasing problem. 26 Companies
like Google and Microsoft, which are also victimized by data
theft, store their data in centers in other countries. 27 In
addition, Apple has announced that it will be expanding its
data center servers into other countries including Curacao,
Furthermore, it is
the Netherlands, and China. 28
hypothetically possible that some of the data at issue was
stolen from foreign data servers owned by third party
application providers who store data for Apple. 29 Therefore, it

24. See, e.g., Apple Insider Staff, Apple to Build Second “Tactical
Datacenter” at Maiden, NC Facility, APPLE INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/14/02/20/apple-to-build-second-tacticaldatacenter-at-maiden-nc-facility; Rich Miller, Apple Buys California Data
Center, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www.datacenterknow
ledge.com/archives/2006/02/27/apple-buys-california-data-center/.
25. See MacDermid v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that
defendant was subject to jurisdiction in Connecticut because she accessed
servers there to steal confidential information). However, this ruling does not
mean that the question of who has jurisdiction is completely settled. See
Damon Andrews & John Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
the Cloud, 73 MD L. REV. 358, 361 (2013). The hypothetical in this article is
stretched to focus on the international defendant because it presents unique
challenges that are certain to arise in time even if they do not apply directly to
Jennifer Lawrence’s circumstances.
26. Martin Giles, Defending the Digital Frontier, THE ECONOMIST (July 12,
2014), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21606416-companies-mar
kets-and-countries-are-increasingly-under-attack-cyber-criminals.
27. Google data center locations are available at: http://www.google.com/ab
out/datacenters/inside/locations/; Microsoft centers are located at: http://www.
microsoft.com/online/legal/v2/en-us/MOS_PTC_Geo_Boundaries.htm.
28. Neil Hughes, Apple Reportedly Expanding Global Data Center Presence
with New Facility in Curacao, APPLE INSIDER (Aug. 16, 2014), http://appleinside
r.com/articles/14/08/16/apple-reportedly-expanding-global-data-center-presencewith-new-facility-in-curacao.
29. According to Apple’s privacy provisions, the company “shares personal
information with companies who provide services such as . . . managing and
enhancing customer data . . . .” “These companies are obligated to protect your
information and may be located wherever Apple operates.” Apple Privacy Policy,
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is likely in the futureif it is not already truethat users
who have had their data stolen will be forced to pursue their
action against a foreign defendant who obtained the
information from a foreign data center. This hypothetical will
incorporate some of these developing trends to demonstrate
the difficulties that will arise in bringing civil claims over
breaches of foreign data centers.
B. Jennifer Lawrence’s Hypothetical Litigation
Suppose that Jennifer Lawrence decides to bring legal
action against those who injured her by stealing and
releasing her photos. 30 Further assume that research by
Lawrence’s attorneys reveals that her stolen photographs
were stored at Apple’s data center in the Netherlands. The
data was stored at the Netherlands data center because it
was the nearest data center when the photos were uploaded
to the cloud while Lawrence was on set in Europe for the
filming of a new movie. 31 After taking the pictures and
uploading them to the cloud (unbeknownst to Lawrence, to be
stored at the Dutch data center), she returned home to
California, and it was there that she became aware that the
photos had been stolen in the intervening period. In addition,
the lawyers discover that the individual who stole Lawrence’s
photos from iCloud committed his nefarious acts from a
computer terminal in Russia. 32 The individual has never
APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
30. In fact Lawrence has already sought legal representation to remove
images posted on the Internet pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. See, e.g., TMZ Staff, Jennifer Lawrence Non-Selfie Nudes Could Pose Legal
Hurdle, TMZ (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.tmz.com/2014/09/03/jennifer-lawrencenude-photos-leak-hacked-copyright/.
31. Data is often uploaded and stored to servers that are nearest to the
location of the uploader to facilitate quick data uploads and downloads. See In
re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 13 MAG. 2814, 2014 WL 1661004 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2014), at
*2 (“[W]here a particular user’s information is stored depends in part on a
phenomenon known as ‘network latency’; because the quality of service
decreases the farther a user is from the datacenter where his account is hosted,
efforts are made to assign each account to the closest datacenter.”).
32. Russia was chosen because of the limited international cooperation
between the countries and because of the high incidence of cyber-theft in the
country. See, e.g., Jeremy Bender, Report: Russian Cyber Crime Syndicate
Linked to Neiman Marcus Theft, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/neiman-marcus-cyber-attack-russian-hackers2014-4.
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visited the United States and does not engage in any business
with the United States. Though the pictures of Lawrence
were accessible to Internet users in the United States and
around the world, the thief hosted the images on Russian
servers with a Russian domain name.
Because Lawrence is a California resident and the
defendant is a foreign national, Lawrence’s attorneys file suit
in the Federal District Court for the Central District of
California based on diversity jurisdiction. 33 Among other
causes of action, 34 Lawrence’s attorneys rely on: (1) California
Penal Code section 502(e)(1), which provides civil remedies
against any person who knowingly takes, makes use of, or
copies data without permission from a computer or network; 35
and (2) a common law claim for invasion of privacy for the
public disclosure of private events. 36

33. “California’s long-arm statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, ‘is
coextensive with federal due process requirements, [so] the jurisdictional
analyses under state law and federal due process are the same’.” CollegeSource,
Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir.
2004)).
34. For the sake of brevity, this Article focuses on two representative
claims and does not investigate related questions about whether Lawrence has
satisfied the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction or venue.
35. Section 502 reads in relevant part:
§ 502. Unauthorized access to computers, computer systems and
computer data.
(c) Except as provided in subdivision (h), any person who commits
any of the following acts is guilty of a public offense:
(2) Knowingly accesses and without permission takes, copies,
or makes use of any data from a computer, computer system,
or computer network, or takes or copies any supporting
documentation, whether existing or residing internal or
external to a computer, computer system, or computer
network.
(e)(1) In addition to any other civil remedy available, the owner or
lessee of the computer, computer system, computer network,
computer program, or data who suffers damage or loss by reason of
a violation of any of the provisions of subdivision (c) may bring a
civil action against the violator for compensatory damages and
injunctive relief or other equitable relief. Cal. Pen. Code § 502.
36. The elements of a claim of invasion of privacy based on the public
disclosure of private facts are as follows: “(1) public disclosure (2) of a private
fact (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and
(4) which is not of legitimate public concern.” Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal.
Highway Patrol, 181 Cal. App. 4th 856, 868 (2010), as modified on denial of
reh’g (Mar. 1, 2010) (quoting Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th
200, 214 (1998)).
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Lawrence’s attorneys believe that the defendant has not
had “such continuous and systematic contacts as to be at
home in” 37 Californiaa threshold requirement to establish
general personal jurisdictionso they decide instead to focus
their proof of personal jurisdiction on specific jurisdiction
based on defendant’s conduct in the forum state. 38 In their
pleadings, Lawrence’s attorneys maintain that personal
jurisdiction is proper based on a number of arguments. First,
the defendant targeted the district by accessing the digital
information owned by Apple in that district. Second, the
defendant directed his efforts at the district by operating a
website which hosts her images and which is accessible to
residents of that district. Third, the defendant knew that
Lawrence resided in California and therefore the distribution
of the pictures would cause harm to her in that state.
The defendant maintains that he is not subject to specific
jurisdiction in the United States. First, he argues that the
data was not stolen from Apple’s data centers within the
district but from a data center located outside of U.S.
jurisdiction. 39 Second, he argues that the website through
which he has made the pictures available was set up and is
maintained in his home country and is accessible to anyone,
anywhere with an Internet connection. Third, he claims that
he did not specifically target Jennifer Lawrence with his
efforts and that his distribution of the images was not
intended to cause harm to her or anyone else but merely to
make information available to people everywhere. Therefore,
the defendant would argue that he has not targeted residents
in the forum state of California nor the victim herself within
that state.

37. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (citations
omitted); see also CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1074
(9th Cir. 2011) (“AcademyOne’s alleged misappropriation of CollegeSource’s
intellectual property does not support general jurisdiction because the
misappropriation was not a ‘continuous and systematic’ forum activity, but was,
rather, a few discrete acts over a relatively short period of time.”).
38. “Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International Shoe decision
have differentiated between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or
case-linked jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131
S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
39. See infra Section II.a.
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II. JURISDICTION FOR INTERNET TORTS:
EXISTING CASE LAW
“Absent one of the traditional bases for personal
jurisdiction (presence, domicile, or consent), due process
requires that the defendant have certain ‘minimum contacts’
with the forum state, ‘such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” 40 There is no Supreme Court precedent governing
the application of jurisdiction in Internet torts. In 2014, the
Court was asked to visit this issue in Walden v. Fiore but
declined to rule on the matter. 41 Nevertheless, Walden and a
patchwork of related case law provide the analytical
framework for determining how and where jurisdiction could
be properly exerted over the data thief in Lawrence’s
hypothetical litigation. Part A of this section explores the
Walden decision in detail, particularly how it re-asserted the
primacy of the minimum contacts test as a defendant-friendly
tool to obstruct aggressive application of personal
jurisdiction. 42 Through its discussion of Walden, Part A also
analyzes the Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, which
articulated an alternative “effects test” for personal
jurisdiction, but which may have been significantly cabined
by the Walden decision. 43 Part B considers the role of another
seminal personal jurisdiction decision based on Internet
usage, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
which considered how the use of a website can create
While the
minimum contacts with a forum state. 44
unanimous nature of the Walden decision suggests a level of
obviousness in the legal reasoning, 45 when the decision is
weaved together with Calder and Zippo, the legal fabric fails
to cover important Internet torts like the photo theft in our
hypothetical.
40. Mainstream Media, EC v. Riven, C 08-3623 PJH, 2009 WL 2157641, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2009) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
41. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014).
42. Id. at 1121–22.
43. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
44. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
45. William Baude, Opinion Analysis: The Boundaries of Specific
Jurisdiction, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 26, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2014/02/opinion-analysis-the-boundaries-of-specific-jurisdiction/.
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A. Walden v. Fiore
In 2014, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that in order
to satisfy the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction
a plaintiff must show that the defendant herself has
established connections to the forum state. 46 The Court held
that where the relevant conduct occurred outside of the forum
state, the fact that a defendant’s conduct affected a plaintiff
connected to the forum state was insufficient to establish
jurisdiction. 47
1. Facts
In 2006, TSA agents at the San Juan airport searched
the carry-on bags of Gina Fiore and her travel companion as
Drug
they attempted to board a plane to Atlanta. 48
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents detained the
travelers after discovering $97,000 in cash in the luggage. 49
Fiore informed agents in San Juan that the cash was the
winnings and bankroll for a gambling trip to a local casino,
that the travelers were professional gamblers, and that they
maintained residency in California and Nevada. 50 Fiore and
her companion were allowed to board the flight but the San
Juan agents contacted their counterparts in Atlanta, who
subsequently detained the travelers upon their arrival in
Atlanta. 51 In Atlanta, DEA agent Walden seized the cash and
informed Fiore that the money “would be returned if they
later proved a legitimate source for the cash.” 52 The travelers
subsequently boarded the last leg of their flight to Nevada. 53
Following the seizure, agent Walden helped draft an
affidavit showing probable cause for the forfeiture of the
funds and forwarded the affidavit to the United States
Attorney’s Office in Georgia. 54 Ultimately, the Department of
Justice did not seek forfeiture and returned the funds in

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1119–20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1119.
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119.
Id.
Id.
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2007. 55 Nevertheless, Fiore and her companion brought a
Bivens action in federal court in Nevada alleging that they
had been injured because: (1) the seizure lacked probable
cause; (2) the DEA withheld the money after concluding that
it was not drug-related; and (3) because Walden had drafted
and forwarded an affidavit purportedly based on false
statements. 56
2. Procedural History
The District Court in Nevada granted Walden’s motion to
dismiss, reasoning that even if Walden caused harm to
plaintiffs in Nevada while knowing that they were living in
Nevada, this could not confer jurisdiction on its own. 57
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that while the
seizure in Georgia could not form the basis of personal
jurisdiction, the purportedly false affidavit could establish
jurisdiction because it was expressly aimed at Nevada and
Walden knew that it would affect persons with a significant
connection to Nevada. 58
3. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Walden v. Fiore
to address “the ‘minimum contacts’ necessary to create
specific jurisdiction.” 59 The Supreme Court emphasized two
particular considerations in determining whether specific
personal jurisdiction existed. First, “the relationship must
arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with
the forum State.” 60 Second, the minimum contacts test is
based on the defendant’s contact with the forum state itself,
not with the persons who reside there. 61
The Supreme Court held that the facts in Walden did not
satisfy these standards:
It is undisputed that no part of petitioner’s course of
conduct occurred in Nevada. Petitioner approached,
questioned, and searched respondents, and seized the cash

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1121.
Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475 (1985)).
Id. at 1122.
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at issue, in the Atlanta airport. It is alleged that
petitioner later helped draft a “false probable cause
affidavit” in Georgia and forwarded that affidavit to a
United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia to support a
potential action for forfeiture of the seized funds.
Petitioner never traveled to, conducted activities within,
contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to
Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper lens—
whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the
forum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant
contacts with Nevada. 62

Respondents argued that the case was analogous to
Calder v. Jones. 63 In Calder, the Supreme Court held that
personal jurisdiction existed over Florida newspaper writers
in California state court for libel. 64 The writers contributed to
a national newspaper with a circulation greater than 600,000
in California, where the celebrity who was the subject of the
article claimed injury. 65 The writers also contacted sources in
the state of California and one of the defendants regularly
traveled to California on business. 66 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court held that jurisdiction over the Florida defendants was
proper in California:
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California
activities of a California resident. It impugned the
professionalism of an entertainer whose television career
was centered in California. The article was drawn from
California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms
both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to
her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In
sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of
the harm suffered.
Jurisdiction over petitioners is
therefore proper in California based on the “effects” of
their Florida conduct in California. 67

However, the Court in Walden rejected this comparison. 68
The Court reinforced that “mere injury to a forum resident is
62. Id. at 1124. (citations omitted).
63. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124; Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984).
64. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 788–89.
68. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125 (“This emphasis [on Calder] is likewise
misplaced.”).
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not a sufficient connection to the forum.” 69 Therefore, the
“proper question” is not where the plaintiff experienced injury
but instead whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to
the forum in a meaningful way. 70 The Court concluded that
the seizure of goods in Georgia caused an injury that was
forum-agnostic: “Respondents would have experienced this
same lack of access in California, Mississippi, or wherever
else they might have traveled and found themselves wanting
more money than they had.” 71 In fact, the Court intimated
that the Calder test may be limited to claims like defamation
where intentional harm in the forum state is a component of
the cause of action. 72 For this reason, Walden may portend a
more limited application of the Calder doctrine.
At the end of the opinion, the court provided addressed
the respondent’s concerns about the consequences of this
decision on Internet torts:
Respondents warn that if we decide petitioner lacks
minimum contacts in this case, it will bring about
unfairness in cases where intentional torts are committed
via the Internet or other electronic means . . . we reiterate
that the “minimum contacts” inquiry principally protects
the liberty of the nonresident defendant, not the interests
of the plaintiff. In any event, this case does not present
the very different questions whether and how a
defendant’s virtual “presence” and conduct translate into
“contacts” with a particular State. To the contrary, there
is no question where the conduct giving rise to this
litigation took place . . . [w]e leave questions about virtual
contacts for another day. 73

This reveals two important themes of the Walden
opinion. First, it reinforces the Court’s belief that personal
jurisdiction is to be construed in favor of the defendant, not
for the benefit of the plaintiff. Second, it shows that, if
possible, the Court will look to the location where the conduct
took place when determining jurisdiction rather than relying
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1124 (“The strength of that connection [to the forum] was largely
a function of the nature of the libel tort. However scandalous a newspaper
article might be, it can lead to a loss of reputation only if communicated to (and
read and understood by) third persons.”).
73. Id. at 1125, n. 9 (citations omitted).
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on the location of the injured party. Both of these themes
have important implications for data theft cases.
B. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.: Publication
to a Website as a Basis of Jurisdiction
The “Zippo test” has been widely adopted by the circuits
as a means to determine whether an Internet portal
accessible in the forum state can create jurisdiction in the
forum state. 74 In Zippo, the district court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania held that whether a website can
establish jurisdiction in a forum depends on the level of
contacts that the website creates with the forum state. 75 The
court held that “[a]t one end of the spectrum are situations
where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet”:
these business transactions satisfy the requirements of
specific jurisdiction. 76 Similarly, “[i]f the defendant enters
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that
involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.” 77 On
the other hand, “where a defendant has simply posted
information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to
users in foreign jurisdictions,” jurisdiction over that
defendant is not proper. 78 Stated another way, “a passive
Web site that does little more than make information
available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” 79 This standard has
provided jurisdiction in a wide range of cases where
defendants only interaction with the forum state was through

74. See Michael A. Geist, Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1367–71 (2001) (collecting and
discussing cases adopting Zippo); William H. Wynne, Roads? Where We’re Going
We Don’t Need Roads: Back to the Future and the Ninth Circuit’s Use of
Traditional Jurisdiction on the Internet Superhighway, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV.
477 (2012). See also Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 251 (2d Cir.
2007); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003); ALS
Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2002)
(collectively adopting the Zippo standard).
75. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123–25
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
76. Id. at 1124.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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a website. 80
III. APPLICATIONS AND AMBIGUITIES POST-WALDEN
Having established the present contours of specific
personal jurisdiction for Internet torts, this section returns to
the specific circumstances of the hypothetical. When a
defendant is domiciled internationally, can he be subject to
personal jurisdiction for the theft and distribution of a U.S.
citizen’s data? There are three potential sources of personal
jurisdiction in the hypothetical case. First, as discussed in
Part A, the availability in California of images of Jennifer
Lawrence on a passive Internet site may establish
jurisdiction in California. Second, as discussed in Part B, the
underlying theft of the photo data from a foreign server
creates jurisdiction in California because the plaintiff is a
California resident. Third, as discussed in Part C, the theft
and distribution of the images creates jurisdiction because
the effect of the actions were knowingly targeted at
California. The first question implicates the Zippo reasoning,
which nevertheless must be viewed in light of the Walden
decision. The second case also implicates Walden because
there are strong comparisons to be made between the seizure
in that case and the theft of Internet data which routinely
travels between different repositories. Finally, the third basis
is rooted in the Calder “effects” test. However, that test may
no longer carry the same force following the Walden decision.
Each of these bases will be considered in turn.
A. Internet Availability as Basis for Jurisdiction
Zippo’s reliance on interactivity likely renders the rule
unfit to litigate the publication of Jennifer Lawrence’s photos.
The Zippo sliding scale is based on the interactivity of the
website. 81 But hackers initially posted the celebrity photos on
passive image sites including 4chan and Reddit. 82 These sites
80. John J. Schulze, Jr., Caveat E-Emptor: Solutions to the Jurisdictional
Problem of Internet Injury, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615, 619–24 (2006) (listing
applications of the Zippo test based on website contacts).
81. See infra Section III.B.
82. Harry Bradford, Everything We Know About The Unnamed Celebrity
Photo Hacker, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/09/02/celebrity-photo-hacker_n_5752642.html (noting that the photos
are believed to have been first uploaded to the Internet via relatively obscure
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are intentionally austere message boards with limited
interactivity besides the ability to post content or to view
comments or images posted by others. 83 Neither website is
interactive in the sense contemplated by the court in Zippo
because the sites do not provide any opportunity for viewers
in California to purchase or engage directly with a product on
the website. 84 More apropos than engaging with products, the
Zippo standard excludes online advertisements as a basis for
jurisdiction because of its passivity. 85 The hosting of the
images in this case is even less interactive than many modern
advertisements. 86
The Supreme Court of California considered a close
example to the our Lawrence hypothetical in Pavlovich v.
Superior Court. 87 In that case, a website operator residing in
Indiana posted a computer program which could decrypt
After
DVDs produced by a California corporation. 88
determining that Pavlovich did not himself have any
connection to California, 89 the court employed the Zippo scale
and found that the passive hosting website did not create
jurisdiction in California. 90 Just as the code at issue in
Pavlovich could be used to tortiously breach the security of
the DVDs, those who download Jennifer Lawrence’s pictures
can use them to commit tortious conduct by causing her
emotional distress and further invading her privacy.
Nevertheless, Pavlovich seems to support the notion that
even when content could be used for nefarious purposes, the
forums like 4Chan and AnonIB, but that they were shared more widely after
the creation of a Reddit community).
83. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming a
district court ruling that a “Zippo-passive” website could not create specific
personal jurisdiction).
84. See, e.g., Wynne, supra note 74, at 491 (finding that the Zippo standard
“encompasses direct commercial activity or the selling of a physical product to
an end-user, but notably excludes Internet advertising.”).
85. See Wynne, supra note 74. But see Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs.,
Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1227–31 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the interactivity
standard in favor of a focus on purposeful availment).
86. Hairong Li & John D. Leckenby, Internet Advertising Formats and
Effectiveness (Oct. 2004), available at http://champtec.googlepages.com/ad_form
at_print.pdf (finding an increase in advertising based on rich media and
keyword searches and a decline in passive banner and sponsorship advertising).
87. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262 (2002).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 274.
90. Id.
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person hosting it is not subject to jurisdiction in the injured
party’s state just because they made the information
available.
Even if a broad reading of interactivity might capture the
conduct in our Lawrence hypothetical, the effect would
swallow the rule and lead to unsatisfactory jurisdictional
outcomes. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc., assertion of jurisdiction based on mere posting
or hosting of content would establish precedent whereby
“every complaint arising . . . on the Internet would
automatically result in personal jurisdiction wherever the
plaintiff’s principal place of business is located.” 91 Similarly,
the Tenth Circuit has emphasized that the analysis should
focus on the intentional direction of activities at the forum
state rather than the mere accessibility of those activities in
that state. 92
The passive hosting as a basis for jurisdiction rejected in
Zippo has similarly failed to catch fire in the European
Union. While EU regulations “potentially subject all cloud
services used by an EU resident to the EU’s data protection
law” 93 the European Court of Justice held in the case of In re
Lindqvist, that the rule should not be read broadly to impose
jurisdiction in every member state over a website that
contained some private information. 94 The Court noted that if
posting information on a website constituted a transfer of
data to all countries where that webpage could be accessed
then EU Member States would actually be discouraged from
permitting any posting because information may be
transferred to a country that will not adequately protect the
posted data according to EU law. 95 The European Court’s
reasoning comports with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Cybersell finding that it would be absurd and incongruous to
subject a website owner to jurisdiction in any location where
the website was accessed. 96
91. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997).
92. See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F. 3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2011).
93. See Paul Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1623, 1650 (2013).
94. In re Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, 2003 E.C.R. I-13020, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=48382&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=EN.
95. Id. at I-13020.
96. See Schwartz, supra note 93, at 1650–51.
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Whether or not an expansive Zippo-like test could lead to
desirable legal outcomes, a viewpoint rejected by American
and European courts, such an approach seems foreclosed by
the Court’s Walden decision, which required defendantspecific contacts and rejected incidental contacts with
plaintiff’s forum. 97
B. Data Seizure as Basis for Jurisdiction
The seizure of the data itself presents a second avenue
for obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant. One could argue
that because the data was stored concomitant on Lawrence’s
phone and at Apple’s data centers, that the theft of the data
occurred on that phone and thus jurisdiction is found
wherever that phone was at the time of the hack. However,
“cloud computing is necessarily (and perhaps counterintuitively) ‘grounded’ by aggregated servers on land or in
water.” 98 Therefore, when an individual like the hypothetical
defendant breaks into a server, they are perpetrating an act
at a physical location where the data is stored even if the fruit
of those efforts is information otherwise contained on a
person’s private device. A few courts have grappled with the
issue of personal jurisdiction where a person takes
information from a remote data server. 99 In these cases,
courts have generally held that minimum contacts exist in
the state where the data was stolen. 100 While this viewpoint
comports with both a Calder analysis and a traditional
minimum contacts analysis, no court has faced this question
with respect to non-U.S. data storage. Nevertheless, a few
decisions have considered the legal implications of theft from
97. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
98. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 360.
99. See, e.g., Rhapsody Solutions, LLC v. Cryogenic Vessel Alternatives,
Inc., 2013 WL 820589, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2013) (finding jurisdiction in
forum state based on non-resident defendant’s access of a company’s forum state
servers); see also Watch Sys. LLC v. Sys. Design Solutions, Inc., Civ. A. No. 09–
5821, 2009 WL 5217085, at *6 (E.D.La. Dec.31, 2009); Abatix Corp. v. Capra,
No. Civ. A. 2:07–CV–541, 2008 WL 4427285, *4 (E.D.Tex. Sept.24, 2008);
Flowserve Corp. v. Midwest Pipe Repair, L.L.C., No. 3:05-CV-1357-N, 2006 WL
265521, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2006); Info. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. ITI of N. Fla.,
Inc., No. 01 C 4668, 2001 WL 1516750, at *7 (N.D.Ill. Nov.28, 2001); Peridyne
Tech. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Matheson Fast Freight, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1366,
1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
100. Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1951, 1955–56 (2005).
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a server in an unknown location, a realistic problem
considering the decentralized and cross-border nature of
cloud storage and a challenge in light of the Walden Court’s
distaste for random or fortuitous jurisdictional hooks. 101
In MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, the Second Circuit held
that a Canadian employee of a Connecticut company was
subject to specific jurisdiction in Connecticut after stealing
company documents from a server physically located in
Connecticut. 102 The court analyzed the data theft under the
Calder “intentionally directed efforts” rather than treating
the theft of data like the car accident in Worldwide
Volkswagen. The Second Circuit found that while “[m]ost
Internet users, perhaps, have no idea of the location of the
servers through which they send their emails,” this particular
defendant “knew that the email servers she used and the
confidential files she misappropriated were both located in
Connecticut.” 103 A district court in Kansas in AgJunction
LLC v. Agragrian Inc. adopted the same logic in denying
jurisdiction where a defendant did not know that the data he
was stealing was specifically stored on servers in the forum
state as opposed to other states in which the plaintiff had
data centers. 104 The court in AgJunction went further,
applying the holding in Walden and declaring, “the fact that
the files were stored in Kansas is the type of ‘random,
fortuitous, or attenuated’ contact that does not satisfy due
process.” 105
Even within the same courtroom, defendant’s knowledge
of server location has prompted divergent dispositions. In
two near identical cases, Microsoft Corp. v. Mountain W.
Computers, Inc. and Microsoft Corp. v. Communications &
Data Systems Consultants, Inc. in the Western District of
Washington, contrary motion to dismiss resolutions turned on
whether the defendant’s knew they were targeting servers in
Washington when committing alleged tortious acts. 106 In the
101. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 8.
102. MacDermid v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 727.
103. Id. at 730.
104. AgJunction LLC v. Agrian Inc., 14-CV-2069-DDC-KGS, 2014 WL
3361728 (D. Kan. July 9, 2014).
105. Id. at *5.
106. Microsoft Corp. v. Mountain W. Computers, Inc., No. C14-1772RSM,
2015 WL 4479490 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 2015); Microsoft Corp. v. Commc’ns &
Data Sys. Consultants, Inc., No. C15-0497 RSM, 2015 WL 5102587 (W.D. Wash.
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first case, Mountain W., the court found that it had specific
jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims against a
small IT company in Utah, because “Defendants affirmatively
contacted Microsoft through internet contact with its servers”
and “they knew Microsoft is located in Washington.” 107 The
court reached this conclusion “regardless of whether
Defendants knew where Plaintiff’s servers were located.” 108
Two months later, the same court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction a claim against a small computer reseller in
Indiana because “Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that
the servers accessed by the instant Defendant are located in
Washington.” 109 As this Article has advised, and other courts,
as in AgJunction have recognized, courts must take care to
not conflate the location of the company itself with the
location of its data servers. Failing to take heed, the
Mountain W. court disregarded the prevalence of off-site (and
out of state) data storage while smoothing over the challenge
this disconnect poses for establishing specific jurisdiction.
Taken together, these decisions illustrate the significant
challenges Lawrence would face in asserting jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant based on the location of the data seizure.
First, the defendant could argue that even if the data was
stored on a server or on Lawrence’s phone in California, that
fact is merely fortuitous and cannot form the basis of
jurisdiction because defendant, like those in AgJunction and
Communications and Data Systems, Inc., did not know the
location of the targeted data. 110 Even if, as in MacDermaid
and Mountain W., the court found that the defendant knew or
should have known of the location of the servers, he may still
be able to argue that jurisdiction is only proper where the
server is located, a conclusion supported by pre and postWalden case law. 111 If the server were in another U.S. state,
Aug. 28, 2015); The court in Mountain W. also considered the defendant’s
purchase of Microsoft software from a third party vendor based in Washington
to establish specific jurisdiction. See Mountain W., 2015 WL 4479490 at *7.
While such a fact could have been dispositive on its own, the court presents the
server access as an independent basis for establishing jurisdiction. Id.
107. Id. at *7–8 .
108. Id.
109. Commc’ns & Data Sys. Consultants, Inc., WL 5102587 at *7.
110. See id.; see also AgJunction, 2014 WL 3361728 .
111. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th
Cir.1996) (pre-Walden); AgJunction, 2014 WL 3361728 (post-Walden).
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jurisdiction and venue would likely be proper in that state
(even if local law might be less favorable). But if the server
is housed abroad, then jurisdiction would not be proper in any
U.S. state. Furthermore, the notion that Lawrence should be
drawn out of her favorable jurisdiction to litigate in North
Carolina or some other state where Apple stored her data
seems no more equitable than hailing the defendant into a
forum in which he has no contacts.
C. Calder “Effects” Test as Basis for Jurisdiction
Walden may have significantly cabined the viability of
the Calder doctrine and consequently reduced its usefulness
in our hypothetical case. The Supreme Court suggested this
very possibility when they ruled that Calder may be limited
to the exceptional nature of the libel tort action, which
requires a person to affect individuals in the jurisdiction. 112
Other courts have speculated that the Walden decision will
limit the effectiveness of Calder. 113 If Calder is limited, its
limitation is to tort actions that by their very nature require
contacts with the forum state. 114 Lawrence’s best argument
may be that the release of private facts tort is analogous to
libel in that it requires a recipient in order to have effect. The
significance of the photo hack was a function of the many
people (including those in California) who viewed the images.
Because the hacker knew or should have known that the
effect would be most pronounced in California where
Lawrence lives, the Calder effects test would render this an
appropriate basis for personal jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, there are marked differences between the
facts in Calder and the circumstances in this hypothetical. In
Calder, the court made note of the fact that the publication
had its most extensive circulation in the state of California. 115
Therefore, the writers for the paper were on notice that the

112. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123–24 (2014).
113. See Streamline Bus. Servs., LLC v. Vidible, Inc., No. 14-1433, 2014 WL
4209550, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2014) (“It appears that this ruling [Walden]
could limit the Calder effects test.”); see also Mountain W., 2015 WL 4479490 at
*5-6 (discussing competing rulings as to whether the Walden decision overruled
the “purposeful direction prong” of the Calder test in the Ninth Circuit).
114. See Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1123–24.
115. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984).
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paper would have a significant effect where it was read. 116
On the other hand, the passive website created by the
defendant is available to anyone, anywhere, so long as there
is an Internet connection. While it may be the case that there
are more people viewing these images in California, and it
may also be the case that the effects would be felt most
strongly in California because Lawrence lives there, it is not
the case that the defendant targeted California in any
meaningful way compared to any other jurisdiction. 117 Rather,
the language of Walden is illustrative: jurisdiction cannot be
based merely on the fortuitous residence of the plaintiff. 118 If
this basis for jurisdiction were sustained, then Lawrence
could have alternatively brought suit in any other state in
which she happened to reside and where individuals had
viewed the images. 119 This expansive interpretation of
jurisdiction is contrary to the reasoning in Walden.
Because no exception was made in Walden for Internet
torts, and as the preceding considerations show, there is a
real concern of at least inconsistent applicability of personal
jurisdiction in cases like the hypothetical and at worst a
finding that jurisdiction is not proper anywhere in the United
States, leaving Lawrence without legal remedy. None of the
available frameworks—the traditional minimum contacts
analysis, the Calder effects test, or the Zippo standard—are a
proper fit for an age of cloud computing. The reasoning in
Walden, applied to the foregoing standards, strengthens the
belief that jurisdiction will not be proper over the
hypothetical defendant in this comment.
At least one
scholarly article anticipated this problem before the Walden
decision. 120 The remainder of this Article assumes that the
lack of a definite remedy is an undesirable outcome both
because it may lead to inconsistencies and because it may
lead to legitimate tort claims devoid of remedy. 121
116. Id. at 789.
117. This is assuming that the website does not employ other interactivity
that would make it especially targeted towards California. See supra Section
III.B (discussing the application of the Zippo standard).
118. Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1125.
119. Id. (“Respondents would have experienced this same lack of access in
California, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have traveled and found
themselves wanting more money than they had.”).
120. See generally Andrews & Newman, supra note 25.
121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and
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IV. SOLUTIONS
The inability to obtain civil remedies for theft of data is
an important policy issue worthy of scrutiny for a number of
reasons. First, the full range of the U.S. judicial system,
including civil remedies, should discourage overt attempts to
steal the data of U.S. citizens. Second, victims of Internet
attacks are worthy of particular sympathy because of our
dependence on Internet services and the omnipresent threat
posed by nefarious actors across the world. Therefore,
jurisdictional nets should be stretched to reach Internet
tortfeasors. Finally, gaps in judicial remedies are unfair to
victims per se and extended jurisdiction would resolve these
inequities. Whatever the reason, there are a number of ways
that the ambiguities or inadequate jurisdiction can be
reduced or eliminated.
A. Jurisdictional Reforms
In 2013, two authors, Damon Andrews and John
Newman, engaged directly with the application of personal
jurisdiction to torts occurring in the cloud-computing
sphere. 122 Though there are some flaws to their proposals,
they are useful starting points for considering solutions to the
jurisdictional deficiencies described above.
1. Caveat Maleficus Standard
Under Andrews and Newman’s caveat maleficus
approach, the location of Internet harm like data theft is
based on the victim’s location. 123 They root the reform in the
tort notion of taking your victim “as they are” transformed to
“taking the victim where they find him.” 124 In our
hypothetical example, this would mean that the defendant’s
theft of data from a foreign data server creates jurisdiction in
California because the injury was perpetrated against a
person in California. 125 The author’s justify this per se
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress.”).
122. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 313–14.
123. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 362.
124. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 362, 364.
125. In the original hypothetical it was suggested that Lawrence returned
home to California after uploading the photos. The caveat maleficus approach
appears to be unavailing if the photos were stolen while Lawrence was still
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jurisdictional hook because “cloud torts that involve the
hacking of remote servers to obtain information are complex
and sophisticated.” 126 While this assertion is dubious in an
age of cheap, accessible, and user-friendly data theft
software, 127 there are even more significant legal challenges
to this framework.
The foremost critique of this per se jurisdictional hook is
that there is no basis for it in case law. As the court
emphasized in Walden when it discussed Internet torts, “the
“minimum contacts” inquiry principally protects the liberty of
the nonresident defendant, not the interests of the
plaintiff.” 128 A per se jurisdictional hook would be exceedingly
plaintiff friendly. In addition, such a broadly sweeping
provision would allow for jurisdiction against the defendant
based only on the plaintiff’s connection to the forum state—an
outcome entirely at odds with the Walden decision’s rejection
of fortuitous connections as a basis for jurisdiction.
2. The Cloud as a Jurisdiction
Andrews and Newman alternatively propose that the
cloud could be established as its own area of jurisdiction with
its own court. 129 This new court would be reserved for “torts
and crimes that occur in the cloud.” 130 The authors point to
the existence of specific jurisdiction courts like the Federal
Appeals Court, which only covers patent-infringement suits
as a model. 131 This approach would remedy Walden’s rejection
of plaintiff-based jurisdiction. 132 Rather, the jurisdiction for
the dispute would be based on the type of conduct, giving

visiting Europe to film her new movie since the injury would then have occurred
in Europe, despite the arbitrariness and inequity of this outcome. See Andrews
& Newman, supra note 25, at 363 n. 296 (showing the problem of caveat
maleficus if the person is traveling when accident occurs).
126. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 363.
127. Christina Warren, How I Hacked My Own iCloud Account, for Just
$200, MASHABLE (Sept. 4, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/09/04/i-hacked-myown-icloud-account/.
128. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123.
129. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 364–65. Andrews and
Newman drew their inspiration for a court of cloud jurisdiction from similar
arguments in David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
130. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 364.
131. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 365.
132. See Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1124.
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sufficient notice to defendant that his activities would impose
jurisdiction in the cloud court. 133
However, it would be difficult to define “torts and crimes
that occur in the cloud” in such a way that the court of cloud
jurisdiction did not swallow the affairs of all other competent
courts. Would such a standard capture all Internet activity
that travels through an Internet company’s data servers? In
addition, would such a court necessarily create jurisdiction
over actions occurring in foreign countries? The geographical
indefiniteness of the cloud means that it extends not only
over domestic jurisdictions but also over foreign locales.
Recent Supreme Court precedent has strongly disfavored the
However, if
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 134
jurisdiction were artificially constrained to not extend
extraterritorially, then the hypothetical defendant in this
case may escape jurisdiction and the cloud court will not have
improved the outcome. If, on the other hand, the court does
extend its reach to foreign activities, the cloud court risks
becoming a haven for the sort of F-cubed 135 litigation—cases
between foreign plaintiffs and defendants concerning events
in foreign countries—that the Supreme Court has tried to
discourage. 136
3. Reform of the Stored Communications Act
Finally, Andrews and Newman propose reforms of the
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) with updates for the
The law was originally passed in
modern digital age. 137
1986 138 and other critics have challenged the law for failing to
keep pace with changes in the digital landscape. 139 Andrews
133. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 365.
134. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)
(“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it
has none”).
135. Linda S. Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here: Cabining the
Extraterritorial Reach of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705 (2014)
(“Basically, an F-cubed case involves a lawsuit brought in an American court by
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign defendants, based on events that took place in
some foreign country.”).
136. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669
(2013) (rejecting the use of the Alien Tort Statute for actions occurring outside
of the territory of the United States).
137. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 366.
138. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2012).
139. Illana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored
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and Newman argue that the law should be updated. 140
However, they provide no specific guidance on how it might
be reformed. 141
Despite the incompleteness of their argument and its
dependence on legislative reform in an era of significant
government recalcitrance, at least one judge has attempted to
expand the scope of the SCA to reach foreign data centers. 142
In In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., Magistrate
Judge James C. Francis held that the government was
permitted to execute a search pursuant to the SCA to obtain
information held by Microsoft in a data center in Ireland. 143
Ordinarily, such orders would violate the presumption
Absent authority
against extraterritorial application. 144
pursuant to the SCA, the government would be required to
obtain the fruits of the search pursuant to a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty and no remedy would be possible in the
absence of a treaty. 145 Francis rebutted this presumption by
noting, “the nationality principle
. . . supports the legal
requirement that an entity subject to jurisdiction in the
United States, like Microsoft, may be required to obtain
evidence from abroad in connection with a criminal
investigation.” 146
Though the Microsoft decision occurred in the context of
warrants pursuant to the SCA for criminal actions, the
reasoning could be reasonably extended to the civil context.
Rather than determine jurisdiction based on the location of
the data centers, the court could base jurisdiction on the
location of the organization the defendant hacked. In our
hypothetical case, this would permit jurisdiction in California
because it is where Apple is located. Thus, a defendant
hacking into Apple’s servers could reasonably anticipate
being hailed into court where Apple does its business even if
Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in
the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 645 (2011).
140. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 25, at 366.
141. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 26, at 366–67.
142. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled &
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 474–75.
146. Id. at 476.
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it hosts its data servers outside of California.
Two problems remain. First, Microsoft and a number of
other cloud storage companies and advocates have vigorously
challenged Judge Francis’s interpretation of the SCA. 147 The
Second Circuit conducted oral arguments in the case in
September 2015. 148 Even Congress has weighed in, proposing
the Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad
(“LEADS”) Act, 149 which would only permit extraterritorial
data seizures of information belonging to a U.S. citizen or
corporation (and finding that the corporations do not own for
these purposes the data on their servers). Even then, only if
the seizure would not be in violation of the foreign country’s
laws. 150 Second, companies are increasingly outsourcing their
storage to third party data centers. 151 As a consequence, it
may not always be clear to a hacker-defendant that his hack
targeted Apple, or any other particular company, when he
hacked the servers of a third party host. Alternatively, the
defendant may argue that he knowingly intended to hack the
servers of the third party but not to hack Apple itself. Such
an argument might limit jurisdiction to where the third party
does business as opposed to all of the places where Apple does
business.

147. See In re Warrant for Microsoft Email Stored in Dublin, Ireland,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, available at https://www.eff.org/cases/rewarrant-microsoft-email-stored-dublin-ireland (database containing amicus
briefs filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, AT&T, and Verizon, in
support of Microsoft); see also Larry Seltzer & Zack Whittaker, Microsoft
Refuses to Comply After Judge Revives Overseas Data Search Warrant, ZDNET
(Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/judge-revives-microsoft-irish-datasearch-warrant-7000033144/.
148. Argument Calendar, Courtroom 1703, United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, http://ww2.ca2.uscourts.gov/calendar/index.php?eID
=735 (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
149. The Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad Act, S. 2871, 113th
Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Sept. 18, 2014).
150. John Ribiero, Senate Bill Would Limit Access to Emails Stored Abroad,
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.computerworld.com/article/26
86099/senate-bill-would-limit-access-to-emails-stored-abroad.html.
151. Archana Venkatraman, Enterprises Spend More on Third-Party
Datacentres Than In-house Ones: Uptime Survey, COMPUTER WEEKLY (Aug. 9,
2013), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240203364/Enterprises-spend-mo
re-on-third-party-datacentres-than-in-house-ones-Uptime-survey.
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B. Other Means of Establishing Jurisdiction
1. International Collaboration
International collaboration on a comprehensive
jurisdictional framework may be the most ideal solution to
our hypothetical. It could not only resolve questions of
jurisdiction but also remedy related challenges of service of
process and judgment collection against a foreign defendant.
While those other facets of civil procedure are beyond the
scope of this Article, it is important to acknowledge that even
if Lawrence could establish personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, it would be difficult to hail the defendant into
court or exercise a default judgment if the defendant declined
to appear (and potentially subject himself to jurisdiction)
without a comprehensive international framework.
However, there are significant barriers to the adoption of
a uniform international standard for data privacy. Countries
operate in a patchwork of national rules governing data
While the Organization for Economic
protection. 152
Cooperation and Development agreed on a framework for
cooperation in the enforcement of privacy laws in 2007, 153
countries continue to develop competing data privacy
frameworks that are fundamentally at odds. 154 Consequently,
international collaboration on data privacy rules represents
more of an aspiration than a concrete solution to the
increasing challenges of international Internet torts.
2. Fact-Specific Arguments
All of the previously suggested solutions to the personal
jurisdiction gap in Internet torts have depended on

152. John J. Schulze, Jr., Caveat E-Emptor: Solutions to the Jurisdictional
Problem of Internet Injury, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615, 627–32 (2006)
(reviewing the data privacy rules for a variety of different countries and how
they relate to U.S. data privacy law).
153. OECD Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the
Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy, OECD: INTERNET ECONOMY,
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdrecommendationoncross-bordercooperationintheenforcementoflawsprotectingprivacy.htm.
154. Donald C. Dowling, Jr., European Union data protection law and USbased multinational banks: a compliance primer, WHITE & CASE CLIENT ALERT,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=056dbb01-0a69-46b6-85f1ac7b8868b18f (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (“The European approach in effect
prioritizes privacy over free speech, while the U.S. in effect does the reverse.”).
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interventions in the law-making process, greater cooperation
between nations, or debatable judicial interpretation.
Therefore, the most favorable option may be a careful
construction of facts that allow the Calder or Zippo tests to
serve as a basis of jurisdiction.
The Calder test may be applicable if Lawrence can show
two things: (1) that the torts she alleges are, like libel,
dependent on the experience of harm in the forum state;155
and (2) that the defendant intended or should have known
that the effects of his tort would be felt in the forum state. 156
Therefore, a court could find that the privacy torts in our
hypothetical fall within a special class, like the claims in
Calder, which justify a unique jurisdictional treatment.
The Zippo test may be used to reinforce the assertion
that the defendant knew that he was targeting California or
as a standalone basis for establishing jurisdiction. 157 In this
case, the key factual considerations will be the extent to
which the author monetized the product through interaction
with California residents or specifically interacted with
residents of that state. 158 If, for instance, the defendant uses
the release of the images to extort Lawrence in exchange for
removal of the images, then a court could find that the
defendant had directed the claims at the forum state. 159
However, the targeting of the forum state must be evident in

155. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984); see also Myers v. Bennett
Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding in a FCRA claim that mental
distress is felt where plaintiff resides thereby establishing jurisdiction over
defendant who induced the mental distress).
156. See Calder, 465 U.S. 783. But see Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Bird, 683
F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Ariz. 2010) (finding no personal jurisdiction over
defendants because knowledge of plaintiff’s place of residence, without more,
insufficient to satisfy express-aiming prong of Calder effects test).
157. In fact courts grapple with the difficult interplay between these two
tests when it comes to intentional torts. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467,
472 n.30 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We need not decide today whether or not a ‘Zippopassive’ site could still give rise to personal jurisdiction under Calder, and
reserve this difficult question for another time.”).
158. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126–27
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (“If Dot Com had not wanted to be amenable to jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania, the solution would have been simple—it could have chosen not to
sell its services to Pennsylvania residents.”).
159. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318–19 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding that a defendant targeted plaintiffs by squatting on a website
using the plaintiff’s name and then extorting the plaintiff in exchange for
relinquishing the site).
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addition to the online activity. 160 Lawrence could additionally
argue that the thief established contacts with California by
posting images on the Internet knowing that the person most
affected (Lawrence) resided in the forum, 161 or that persons in
California were particularly likely to make use of the images
on the website. In Pavlovich, the California Supreme Court
left the latter legal argument open when it relied in part on
the fact that “there is no evidence that any California
resident ever visited, much less downloaded the DeCSS
source code from, the LiVid Web site.” 162 If Lawrence could
show that users in California most often downloaded the
images of her, then she may be able to claim that the site was
interactive vis-à-vis the forum state. Because one purpose of
a passive image-hosting site is to encourage the distribution
and downloading of those images, the “interactivity” would be
the very encouragement for California residents to download
the images for themselves.
CONCLUSION
Considering the prompt legal action by Jennifer
Lawrence and other celebrities to limit harms suffered by the
release of their private photographs, it is not unreasonable to
believe that suits for damages will be forthcoming. When
those suits come, the celebrities will face a difficult challenge
establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant(s),
especially if the defendants are foreign citizens. Increased
reliance on cloud-based Internet services has resulted in the
storage of Internet data in locales around the world. In
addition, Internet data theft can be effortlessly perpetrated
without regard for traditional jurisdictional borders. In fact,
the entire celebrity photo hack could have occurred without
any contact with the U.S.
The challenges faced by victims of Internet torts are

160. Dinar Corp. Inc. v. Sterling Currency Grp., LLC, 2:13-CV-02106-APG,
2014 WL 4072023 (D. Nev. Aug. 15, 2014) (“[T]he cases finding ‘something more’
[connecting defendant’s actions to the forum state] focus on actions targeted at
the forum taken in addition to the online activity.”).
161. See, e.g., Brayton Purcell, L.L.P. v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d
1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that jurisdiction was proper where the
advertiser knew that they were infringing the work of a resident of the forum
state); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320–22 (9th Cir. 1998).
162. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 276 (2002).
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exacerbated by the lack of clear judicial guidance. In Walden
v. Fiore respondents advised the Supreme Court that their
decision could have far reaching implications for jurisdiction
in Internet torts. The Court’s disregard for this concern
leaves a figurative cloud of uncertainty hanging over personal
jurisdiction in the digital cloud, especially for precipitating
Internet tort cases like those posed in our hypothetical.
Furthermore, the prior court tests established in Calder and
Zippo are, following Walden, at best fraught with ambiguity,
and at worst support a finding of no jurisdiction. Therefore,
foreign citizens committing acts that affect the United States
may leave victims of their crimes to depend on changes to
national or international legal norms or particularly
beneficial facts in order to avoid the pressing problems of
obtaining relief from Internet torts.

